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Explaining policy change in the EU: Financial reform after the crisis 
Charlotte Burns, Judith Clifton and Lucia Quaglia 
 
ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) has been hit by financial and economic crises since 2008. To shed 
light upon the impact of these crises this article reviews punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) 
to develop expectations that are tested against two cases of financial regulation and 
privatisation policy. In one, despite the demand for a new model from EU leaders, limited 
change occurred; in the other, despite legal limitations, significant change emerged. Analysis 
of the cases reveals a new form of policy venue, and the suggestion that the EU PET 
literature must consider more systematically and explicitly the role of veto players in shaping 
policy change. 
 
KEYWORDS Financial regulation; privatization; punctuated equilibrium theory.  
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Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has been hit by major financial and economic crises (FEC) since 
2008 but the impact of these crises and the extent to which they have led to policy change 
remains open to debate. Some scholars suggest that there has been an active and robust 
response particularly compared to the 1930s (Alumnia et al. 2010), whilst others have argued 
that there has not, as yet, been any substantive change (Blyth 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher 
2013; van Hooren et al. 2014). These divergent findings suggest the need for further research 
on the dynamics of policy change in the EU in response to major external shocks, which this 
article seeks to address. The article also responds to calls for more systematic evaluation of 
policy change in the EU (Princen 2013), contributing to the burgeoning and rich public policy 
literature that uses empirical examples to further theoretical development (e.g. see inter alia, 
Cashore and Howlett 2009, Littoz-Monnet 2014, Pralle 2006).  We do so by analysing two 
policies: one on financial regulation, where we would expect significant change in response 
to the FEC but actually find only incremental shifts; another on privatisation, where we 
would expect little or no change due to the institutional legal constraints placed in particular 
upon the Commission, where instead we see significant policy change.  
 
We use the cases to probe and further develop expectations about the dynamics of policy 
change in the EU using tools from punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2009), with which we critically engage. We develop expectations drawn from PET that 
we examine using evidence from our cases to uncover explanations for when and how change 
occurs in the EU. Thus, this article makes an empirical contribution through analysis of the 
cases, specifically identifying a new type of bridging µYHQXH¶ used by EU policy makers; and 
a theoretical contribution via testing of expectations to inform future research. We suggest 
the EU PET literature can be strengthened by the inclusion of more examples of limited 
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policy change, not least because the scope for venue-shifting in the EU is increasingly 
circumscribed. Hence, we suggest that more nuanced analysis of the role of policy 
entrepreneurs and veto players is required. In our cases, we find that more radical policy 
change takes place where the µQHZ¶ policy image is related to an already dominant 
ideological paradigm. 
 
Research design and theoretical framework 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) has been designed to capture inertia, incremental 
change and major transformational change within policy systems (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009). PET suggests that policies tend towards inertia with incremental changes taking place 
slowly over long periods of time, with occasional µSXQFWXDWLRQV¶ that lead to policy 
transformation (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). The PET literature assumes that actors have 
limited information processing abilities and can therefore only concentrate upon a small 
number of issues at any one time (Baumgartner et al. 2014).  Policies are largely decided at 
the subsystem level, which is dominated by bureaucrats and policy experts. Once a focusing 
event occurs, it is assumed that increased issue salience can push an issue (or allow it to be 
pushed by a policy entrepreneur) onto the macro-systemic level of policy-making (ibid). Yet, 
not all focusing events lead to change: they may lead to limited change, or to a mixed pattern 
within the same system (Howlett 2009), and sometimes change occurs due to a build-up of 
pressure within the subsystem without external pressure (i.e. it is endogenous to the policy 
system). In this article we focus upon exogenous shocks, specifically the financial and 
economic crises that hit the EU from 2008 onwards, in order to identify whether and how 
such shocks lead to policy change.  
  
4 
 
Two key causal mechanisms used by PET theorists to explain policy change are venue-
shopping and policy framing. A policy venue is the institutional locus where authoritative 
decisions on a given policy are taken (Baumgartner and Jones 2009: 32). Venue-shopping 
occurs when policy entrepreneurs take advantage of issue salience to drive through change in 
a given area by shifting policy-making to another venue, which is more conducive to the 
pursuit of their goals. The success of venue-shopping is linked to the successful manipulation 
of policy image or policy framing by these policy entrepreneurs. A policy image is how a 
policy is discussed, understood (Baumgartner and Jones 2009:25) and also projected to 
policy-makers and the wider public. The framing of policy issues is central to the attempt to 
shift venues and reflects the constellation of interests and fault lines of contestation within a 
political system (Daviter 2007).  
 
There is an assumption within PET that political systems have a status quo bias, and that the 
reframing of an image is central to policy change (Baumgartner et al. 2014). Policy makers 
might seek first to reframe an issue in order to justify the use of a new venue and facilitate the 
shift from one venue to another. A classic EU example is the framing of tobacco advertising 
as an economic issue in order to circumvent restrictive rules on health policy-making 
(Princen 2007). Hence, venue shifting and policy framing are used by policy actors that seek 
policy change but are restricted from doing so by institutional µfriction¶, that is, where the 
institutional framework in a given policy area may µLPSRVH certain ³hurdles´ for policy 
FKDQJH¶ (Princen 2013: 858, see also Baumgartner et al. 2009; Walgrave and Vleingenthart 
2010). It is generally assumed that reframing takes place ahead of a venue shift and that the 
new policy image and venue become mutually reinforcing ± leading to positive feedback 
from the new venue to policy framing that can justify the new locus for policy making 
(Baumgartner et al. 2014; Princen 2013). This relationship between framing and venue 
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shifting is, however, slightly circular ± change happens when actors push for change and 
when a venue is present and a new image available. This circular logic has been enhanced by 
the way the PET case study literature has developed within EU studies as it is dominated by 
cases of successful venue shift and policy change.  
 
This emphasis is no doubt largely because the EU, with its system of multi-level governance, 
provides numerous potential loci for venue-shopping (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Mahoney 
and Baumgartner 2008; Princen 2007). The vast majority of the literature on venue shifting in 
the EU (see Princen 2013 for a review) has examined the activities of national advocacy 
groups and whether and how they seek to take advantage of the multiple points of access 
offered by the (8¶V system of multi-level governance via vertical venue-shopping (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2012; Guiradon 2000; Kaunert and Leonard 2012; Littoz-Monnet 2014; 
Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008; Princen 2010). A clear advantage offered by EU-level 
venues is that they allow domestic policy actors to escape conflict or constraints at home by 
reducing the range of actors, and therefore potential veto players, involved in the policy area 
(Princen 2007). Moreover, policy-making at the EU level has the advantage of being 
relatively insulated from popular mobilisation within the nation states, making it easier to 
devise and implement potentially unpopular policies. There is also scope for horizontal intra-
EU as well as extra-EU venue-shopping, such as the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V entrepreneurship in the 
field of social policy (Cram 1993; Wendon 1998) and Directorate General (DG) 
&RPSHWLWLRQ¶V efforts to select between different external venues in order to secure its policy 
preferences (Damro 2006). In these instances, actors engage in venue-shopping to secure 
more freedom to pursue their preferences in the immediate and longer-term.  
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Hence, there is a well-developed case-study based literature on venue-shopping and PET in 
the EU. This approach, of analysing a small n to explore the reasons for the success of venue 
shifting, provides a rich source of data that allows analysts to identify the preconditions for 
change, which can be developed into expectations. However, by failing to analyse 
systematically the absence of change this literature remains underdeveloped, which 
potentially limits its theoretical leverage. A key explanation for the failure to achieve change 
is the presence of countervailing pressure and veto players. Institutional friction has emerged 
as a key analytical lever within PET for understanding patterns of policy punctuation: the 
greater the friction the more punctuated the pattern of policy that emerges, as incremental 
changes over time may eventually lead to unsustainable pressure and cause a policy 
punctuation (Jones et al. 2003). Studies have focused upon veto points in different systems 
and the level of costs associated with different stages of the policy process to explain 
incremental shifts (ibid; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Yet interestingly, there has been limited 
systematic evaluation within the EU PET literature of how, when and why actors seek to 
block policy change (also see Givel 2010). To address these shortcomings, this article is 
located within the qualitative small n tradition, and analyses two cases, strategically selected 
to include one case where we would expect change and it fails to emerge and one where we 
would not expect change but significant policy change occurs. Both cases therefore deviate to 
some degree from standard expectations (Gerring 2007; Ljiphart 1971), so by analysing them 
we can develop a more nuanced understanding of both the drivers and the barriers to policy 
change in the EU. We also contribute to the wider PET literature by identifying the source of 
institutional friction within the cases analysed, which can provide a basis for analytical 
generalisations to inform EU PET. We proceed by developing expectations that emerge from 
the PET literature, which we then subject to empirical scrutiny using our cases.  
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As outlined above, the existing literature suggests that 1) policy change is often preceded by 
successful venue-shifting, which occurs when an exogenous event acts as a focusing issue 
that drives up policy salience leading policy to shift from the subsystemic to the macro-
political level; 2) a credible and alternative policy image and venue are assumed to be 
available to justify a shift in venue; 3) entrepreneurs are able to overcome countervailing 
pressures; 4) reframing normally takes place ahead of venue shift;  5) positive feedback 
between the new policy frame and the new venue continues to justify policy activity in the 
new locus. In the following sections we provide an account of our two cases studies, before 
analysing the implications of our findings for these expectations. 
 
Case study 1: Incremental reform of EU financial regulation  
 
The international financial crisis was a major focusing event: bank losses reached £16.3 
trillion in the EU and gross financial sector assistance amounted to 8% of EU gross domestic 
product (GDP), causing a deterioration of the public budget balance of 2% of GDP across the 
EU. The crisis substantially increased the salience of financial regulation, indicated, for 
example, by the thousands of newspaper articles that mentioned the words µILQDQFLDO 
UHJXODWLRQ¶ or µILQDQFLDO FULVLV¶ over the period 2008-10. Nonetheless, somewhat counter-
intuitively, EU post crisis financial regulation underwent only incremental change, rather 
than transformation.  
Whilst the Commission has exclusive competence to propose EU legislation, it was µFDXWLRXV 
about mobilizing information and ideas in favour of financial re-UHJXODWLRQ¶ (Hodson 2013: 
304). Charles McCreevy, Internal Market commissioner (2004 to 2010), had been a staunch 
supporter of µOLJKW WRXFK¶ principle-based regulation prior to the crisis (e.g. McCreevy 2007), 
which fitted well with the overall µEHWWHU UHJXODWLRQ¶ approach of the centre-right Barroso. It 
was therefore difficult for McCreevy and Barroso to invert their regulatory µWDNH¶ after the 
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crisis. The Commission became more pro-active in re-regulating finance after Michel Barnier 
was appointed Single Market Commissioner in 2010 in the second Barroso Commission. In 
one of his first speeches, Barnier (2010) criticised pre-crisis µVelf-regulation¶ and µUHJXODWRU\ 
JDSV¶, however, he was also critical of µRYHU-UHJXODWLRQ¶ adding that µ, don't want to regulate 
for the sake of regulation«ZKDW we need is appropriate and efficient UHJXODWLRQ¶ 
Furthermore, the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V hands were tied by major disagreements amongst the 
member states on the content and pace of financial reforms. Here, the Commission could not 
form an µalliance¶ with the European Central Bank (ECB), unlike, for example, in the case of 
Banking Union (Epstein and Rhodes 2015), because the ECB was not responsible for 
banking supervision until the Single Supervisory Mechanism was established in 2014.  
Hence, the Commission did not act as a policy entrepreneur for EU financial reforms at the 
agenda-setting stage; nor, however, did policy-makers in key states such as France and 
Germany. These countries, despite µJHVWXUH SROLWLFV¶ (Buckley and Howarth 2010), engaged 
in a limited reform of domestic financial regulation (see, for example, Jabko 2012; Handke 
and Zimmermann 2012), even though some of the &RPPLVVLRQ¶V legislative proposals in this 
period can be ascribed to Franco-German pressure. For example, the French presidency of the 
EU in the second semester of 2008 prioritised EU legislation on Credit Ratings Agencies and 
the European Council called for a legislative proposal on the matter in late 2008 (Council of 
the European Union 2008). A joint letter by Merkel and Sarkozy (2009) advocated a tough 
regulatory regime for hedge funds, to be overseen µsimilarly to banks¶. But French and 
German policy-makers were rather µLQWHUPLWWHQW¶ (and opportunistic) in their agenda-setting 
efforts: they were keen to regulate financial services that their countries possessed in limited 
number (such as rating agencies, hedge funds, over-the-counter derivatives) rather than 
banks, which had been the epicentre of the crisis but were also the backbone of continental 
financial systems. 
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Despite some initial attempts to blame and hence tarnish the image of µJOREDOised Anglo 
Saxon ILQDQFH¶ no convincing alternative to this policy image was successfully articulated. 
In the wake of the crisis, Sarkozy remarked that µWKH idea of the all-powerful market that must 
not be constrained by any rules, by any political LQWHUYHQWLRQ«LV ILQLVKHG¶ (Sarkozy 2008). 
Similarly, the German Finance Minister Peer Steinbruck argued that µWKH free market-above-
all attitude and the argument used by ³ODLVVH]-IDLUH´ purveyors was as simple as it was 
GDQJHURXV¶ (EUobserver 2008). However, no consensus was reached on a new policy image 
for EU financial regulation (and elsewhere, Blyth 2013), thus the neoliberal policy image of 
µJOREDOised ILQDQFH¶ remained resilient in the face of enormous challenges (Schmidt and 
Thatcher 2013).  
 
Indeed, the policy image of µJOREDOised ILQDQFH¶ characterised by mobility was advanced by 
UK authorities, when advocating EU legislation that would not µHQGDQJHU¶ the 
competitiveness of EU financial industry (with its stronghold in the City of London). For 
example, when the directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) was 
negotiated, a UK Treasury minister, Lord Myners, pointed out the need µWR make the EU a 
base [for hedge funds] from which to compete in global PDUNHWV¶ (Myners 2009). Similarly, 
the financial industry successfully presented a counter-image of globalised finance that 
restricted the regulatory room for manoeuver in the EU on the grounds that financial 
activities would relocate outside the EU (e.g. Tait and Maste 2009). Though fleeting 
alternative policy images were aired, none gained consensus and the logic that finance must 
be global dominated. 
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The new rules were adopted via the ordinary legislative procedure within typical institutional 
fora. The scope for finding an alternative venue was circumscribed because financial 
regulation constitutes a key part of the Single Market: it is in effect the core of the acquis 
communautaire and subject to the community method. The content of the rules initially 
proposed by the Commission was watered down during the legislative negotiations on several 
occasions, such as in the case of the AIFM directive (Pagliari 2011; Woll 2013). As is 
common practice in EU negotiations, the legislative process was characterised by the quest 
for compromises and trade-offs amongst the member states in the Council, arm twisting 
between the Council and the Parliament and competing interests of the financial industry.  
 
At the decision-making stage, British policy-makers, worried about the international 
competitiveness of the City of London and the risk of µUHJXODWRU\ DUELWUDJH¶ (Quaglia 2012), 
often managed to dilute proposals, as with EU legislation on rating agencies, or alternative 
investment fund managers. Sometimes, French and German policy-makers also watered 
down proposals, as with the capital requirements for banks or bank structural reform. For 
example, the Bundestag (2010) opposed a major tightening of capital requirements, 
emphasizing the need to preserve µWKH supply of credit - especially to small and medium sized 
enterprises - in the German economy¶. Similarly, the French Parliament (Assemblée 
Nationale 2012) expressed concerns about the implications of stricter capital rules for 
financing the µUHDO HFRQRP\¶ and criticised µWKH accelerated timetable for their entry into 
IRUFH¶. By contrast, the UK supported stricter capital rules. Thus, the UK Chancellor together 
with seven European finance ministers published a letter criticizing the efforts of the 
Commission, France and Germany to water down the application of international capital 
standards (the Basel III accord) in the EU (Djankov 2011). 
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The parts of the financial industry that would be directly affected by the new EU rules were 
keen to prevent them or to limit their scope, de facto forming ad-hoc alliances with 
recalcitrant member states. Thus, rating agencies and hedge funds unsuccessfully sought to 
block the proposed EU rules at the agenda-setting stage. The Alternative Investment 
0DQDJHUV¶ Association (AIMA) (2009a) argued that hedge funds were the µvictimV¶ of the 
international financial crisis and that overall they had performed well during the crisis, hence 
no EU regulation was needed. Rating agencies argued that EU rules were unnecessary given 
the existing voluntary (non-binding) rules at the international level (the Code of Conduct 
issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions) (Standard and Poors 
2008). At the decision-making stage, hedge funds and rating agencies engaged in intense 
lobbying to amend the rules, which they argued would be overly prescriptive and costly to 
implement, creating potential regulatory arbitrage vis-à-vis countries outside the EU (AIMA 
2009b). In other cases, banks argued that higher capital requirements would restrict the flow 
of funding to the real economy (German Banking Association and Association of Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry 2011; German Industry Federation 2011), pointing out the 
µ(XURSHDQ specificities regarding access to finance and bank OHQGLQJ¶ (French Industry 
Association 2015).  
 
Despite this policy area being identified as a source of the crisis, discursively identified as 
problematic and shifting from the subsystem to the macro-political level, there was 
overwhelming status quo bias. The lack of a dedicated policy entrepreneur, the absence of a 
credible alternative policy image or policy venue, resulted in incremental change in financial 
regulation. The main changes to EU post-crisis financial regulation concerned the regulatory 
framework and specific pieces of legislation. The European Systemic Risk Board was 
established in 2010 to monitor macro-prudential risks in the EU. The existing EU committees 
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of national financial supervisors were transformed into independent authorities with legal 
personality, increased budget and enhanced powers (Hennessy 2014). New EU legislation 
was issued on rating agencies, alternative investment fund managers (including hedge funds), 
over-the-counter derivatives as well as capital requirements and liquidity rules for banks. The 
new rules either regulated activities or financial institutions that were previously unregulated 
in the EU (derivatives) or subject to self-regulation (rating agencies and hedge funds). In 
other instances, the new rules imposed higher capital requirements for banks and new 
liquidity management rules (Quaglia 2012).  
  
Case Study 2: Reform of privatisation 
There was nothing in the EU treaties to suggest that the Commission would end up actively 
pushing a privatisation agenda in the aftermath of the FEC. The Commission had been a 
leading actor in promoting liberalisation, deregulation and competition across multiple 
sectors, particularly after the Single European Act in 1986. However, this was all in the name 
of market integration, and it had refrained from promoting privatisation, defined as the sale of 
public assets to the private sector, because it was legally required to maintain a neutral stance 
on the question of ownership (EC 1957 Art: XX).  The Commission´s active promotion of 
privatisation to ailing EU member states in the aftermath of the FEC consequently amounted 
to a radical policy change.  
 
If a democratically elected, domestically indebted government had pushed for privatisation of 
the nation´s assets in order to alleviate that debt, it would not be interpreted as a major policy 
change. Privatisation has been widely used in the EU context since the 1980s (Clifton et al., 
2006). However, the way in which the Commission teamed up with the ECB and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to form the Troika, and proceeded to use this venue to 
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propose loans conditional on policies, including privatisation, to negotiate and then monitor 
international bailout programmes to states in the EU periphery, was unprecedented and made 
this a radical policy departure.  
 
Privatisation, in contrast to financial regulation, was not a salient topic in the immediate 
aftermath of the financial crisis. After all, privatisation or a lack of it was not the reason for 
the crises. However, in the lead up to *UHHFH¶s first bailout, finally approved in May 2010, 
resentment and frustration among policy-makers in creditor countries grew with Greek 
politicians. The idea that Greek governments had behaved irresponsibly, and that they were 
not doing enough to pay their debts emerged as a dominant discourse and privatisation 
emerged as a solution due to the agenda-setting efforts of the Commission, the ECB and 
German policy-makers. Controversially, the broadsheet Bild (2010) suggested that Greece 
should sell its islands, historic buildings and artwork to pay its debt.  Eurogroup President 
Juncker advocated a solution modeled after the German Treuhand, the vast sell-off of East 
German firms in the 1990s following the fall of communism (Holehouse 2011). The (&%¶V 
chief economist Jurgen Stark also argued in favour of µD massive privatisation SURJUDPPH¶ in 
Greece, given that µH[SHUWV estimate the privatisation potential at up to 300 billion euros¶ 
(Breidthardt 2011). It was in this increasingly bitter context that creditors, particularly 
financial institutions based in France and Germany who were overwhelmingly exposed to 
Greek debt (BIS, 2011: 15), pressurised policy-makers to impose privatisation. Legally, 
however, the Commission could not act as a policy entrepreneur, as it lacked the power in the 
treaties to promote privatisation.  
 
In this scenario, the policy image of privatisation was recast by scaling down its classic 
economic rationale, and reducing it to a sub-tool of financial reform. Traditionally, 
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privatisation was justified by the claims that it exposed managers to market forces, made 
managers more accountable to shareholders and increased firm and government efficiency 
(Megginson and Netter 2001). However, privatisation alone was insufficient, and needed to 
be accompanied by other policies. These included sectoral competition, to avoid replacing 
public monopolies with private ones and ensuring markets worked (Clifton et al., 2006), and 
sectoral regulation, since many activities performed by the state sector had public good 
qualities (Clifton et al., 2016). The financial benefit of privatisation was contingent because, 
although governments would get an immediate cash injection, future profits from this activity 
would no longer be channeled to the public purse. These nuanced approaches were dropped 
in the alternative policy image: privatisation was cast as a quick, decisive way of raising 
money to improve the short-term fiscal solvency of debtor countries. Questions of efficiency, 
competition and regulation were pushed into the background. The narrowing down of 
privatisation to its fiscal core was reminiscent of the 1990s, when some countries had used 
privatisation proceeds to qualify for Maastricht and EMU (Wagschal and Wenzelburger, 
2008; Savage, 2001; Zohlnhöfer et al., 2008). This policy image as a narrow tool for financial 
reform of ailing Member States facilitated its inclusion as part of the broad conditionality 
programmes of structural reform.  
  
As a narrow financial policy, privatisation was introduced as part of the 7URLND¶V agenda. The 
three bodies worked in parallel as equal partners: the Commission provided authority, the 
ECB monetary governance and the IMF technical expertise in loan management in times of 
crisis. The Troika dated from 2010 when the Eurogroup sought to utilise the ,0)¶s technical 
expertise in crisis management to address the Greek crisis. The arrangement had its roots in 
previous collaboration to implement conditional loans to Hungary, Latvia and Romania 
(Hodson 2015; Kincaid 2016). Hence the Troika acted as a bridge between the EU and the 
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IMF. By using these existing structures in a new way the Troika was able to address the debt 
of ailing Member States via financial reform prescriptions and conditional loans through 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU).  
 
In the decision-making phase, Greece was the first, and most extreme, case as regards 
privatisation demands. Financial assistance was dependent on the request that the government 
prepare a list of state entities to sell to generate at least ¼1 billion (European Commission 
2010:57). By the second MOU, the Commission stated that privatisation proceeds had been 
µGLVDSSRLQWLQJ so IDU¶ (European Commission 2012:4). The Greek government then included 
a far more ambitious list of state assets for privatisation, including public services such as 
gas, water, post, electricity, railways, Athens airport and defence, and real estate, which it 
estimated would raise around ¼50 billion by 2015 (European Commission 2012, Annex II). 
The Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF), established in Athens 2011 in 
order to oversee privatisation progress, enjoyed a close working relationship with the 
Commission. For example, the Commission and euro area member states appointed two 
HRADF members, as observers. Three members of the Council of Experts advising the 
HRADF board were Troika appointees. The narrow, creditor-looking role of the HRADF can 
be seen in its own mission statement: µThe sole mission of the HRADF is to maximise the 
proceeds of the Hellenic Republic from the development and/or sale of assets¶.1  Other 
requirements, such as competition and regulation, are not included.  
 
At the decision-making stage, German policy-makers were key players pushing for 
privatisation. For example, during the heated bail out negotiations in June 2015, *UHHFH¶V 
creditors, notably Germany (Bundesregierung 2015), argued that Greek asset sales would 
proceed more efficiently if an outside body took over the process (Alderman 2015). The 
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German Government proposed that a µWUXVW IXQG¶ should be established, with a µWDUJHWHG total 
of ¼ billion¶ (Bundesregierung 2015). Subsequently, in the third bail-out package to 
Greece, German policy-makers insisted on a Greek privatisation goal of ¼50 billion 
(Nienaber 2016).  
 
Beyond Greece, the Troika pushed for structural reform, including privatisation, in other 
member states, particularly Portugal and Cyprus. The Cypriot Parliament initially voted to 
reject privatisation in February 2014, but voted again to accept it in March rather than face 
the withholding of financial disbursement (Stamouli and Persianis 2014). The Irish case was 
different, as the proceeds required from privatisation as a condition for financial assistance 
changed several times, and the Irish government had more discretion to decide which assets 
should be sold (Palcic and Reeves 2013).  
 
The Troika has become increasingly controversial and its promotion of privatisation 
contested. For example, on taking office in 2015 the Tsipras government immediately refused 
to recognise the Troika (Papadimas and Koutantou 2015). The explicit use of privatisation as 
a narrow tool to maximise cash for creditors, when many of the assets for sale are destined 
for societal welfare, led to criticisms of the Troika promoting a µfire sale¶ (Rankin and Smith 
2015) prompting mass public demonstrations (Ancelovici et al. 2016). Hence, privatisation 
emerged as an area of political contestation at the domestic level. Thus, as in our first case, 
financial interests (primarily French and German creditors) played a key role as a coalition 
supporting the Commission and &RXQFLO¶V delegation of power to the IMF in order to secure 
policy change (Hodson 2015).   
 
Analysis  
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How then do our cases conform to the expectations outlined above? In the case of financial 
regulation, on our first expectation, that a crisis will act as a focussing event by increasing 
issue salience and the demand for policy change, prompting policy entrepreneurs to shift 
policy from the policy subsystem to the macro-political level, it is clear that the FEC did act 
as a focusing event that drove up issue salience. However, there was no policy entrepreneur: 
the Commission was unwilling and unable to perform this role and, whilst political leaders 
made pronouncements about the need to change the financial paradigm, there was little 
political will to do so and limited evidence of policy making its way out of the subsystem 
beyond some gesture politics. In contrast, privatisation had little initial salience but, as the 
crisis deepened, tensions increased and bailout packages were designed, prompting creditors 
increasingly to call for privatisation in the debtor countries. The Commission, with the 
support of the ECB and policy-makers in Germany, acted as an entrepreneur by putting 
privatisation on the EU policy agenda.  
 
Concerning our further expectations that an alternative and credible policy image is available 
that can be used to justify shifting policy to a new venue, and that a credible and alternative 
policy venue is present to justify an attempt to shift venue, there was no alternative policy 
frame offered by any of the key actors in financial regulation, no strong coalition advocating 
policy reform emerged and there were no alternative venues that could be identified to justify 
a reframing. The status of regulation as being central to the acquis communautaire provided a 
significant constraint for developing a new policy venue.  Hence, new regulatory measures 
were brought forward, but they did not represent a substantial break with the past and were 
adopted via ordinary legislation proposed by the Commission (DG Internal Market) and co-
decided by the Ecofin council and the European Parliament. This kind of incremental policy-
making is entirely in keeping with PET, which seeks to capture both incremental and radical 
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change. What happened here was the mobilisation of existing interests to maintain the status 
quo; so-called countervailing forces, which were largely composed of financial interests, 
albeit acting in slightly different ways depending upon their interests. Hence the expectation 
that policy entrepreneurs would be able to overcome countervailing pressures (e.g. 
entrenched interests) to reframe an image and secure venue-shift did not apply in the case of 
financial regulation as there was no consistent policy entrepreneur and entrenched interests 
blocked the reframing of regulation. There was also limited political will to follow through 
on the discursive construction of regulation as the answer to crisis. Give the failure to shift 
venue positive feedback between image and venue to justify the new locus of policy activity 
did not apply. 
 
In the privatisation case, the policy image was recast. The traditional image of privatisation 
as increasing firm efficiency, if other conditions such as competition and regulation are in 
place, was narrowed down to privatisation as an instrument to maximise proceeds from asset 
sales. Thus, privatisation became merely part of structural reform for conditional loans. There 
was, however, no existing venue to legislate for privatisation at the EU level as it is explicitly 
ruled out in the EU treaties. Nevertheless, after reframing it as part of financial reform, the 
Troika arrangement provided a new institutional venue that the Commission could use; thus 
we see a confirmation of our third expectation. There were also countervailing forces present, 
as manifested in the public demonstrations and political unrest in Greece in particular. 
However, these have had little political traction, although they may have constrained positive 
feedback between the policy image and use of venue, which raises questions about the 
permanence of the Troika as a vehicle for the pursuit of privatisation. 
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The role played by policy entrepreneurs and veto players was crucial in determining the 
presence and extent of change in response to the FEC. In financial regulation, the 
Commission was quite active at the agenda-setting stage when proposing new µmarket-
shaping¶ legislation, but its influence waned in the decision-making stage, where institutional 
obstacles in the form of OLP set a high bar for agreement. Other important actors played a 
critical role, especially at the decision-making stage, in defending the status quo, namely the 
UK financial industry and government, which were concerned about the implications of 
regulation for London as a financial centre. Continental policy-makers also watered down EU 
banking legislation that could be detrimental to their bank-based financial sector and the real 
economy. Hence, the role of key veto players seems to have been as important as the absence 
of a skilled entrepreneur in explaining the outcome. In privatisation there were veto players, 
notably national governments and publics, but in contrast there was conditionality and an 
asymmetric balance of power. The Troika held all the cards, the need for financial support 
outweighed opposition, at least at the institutional level. Interestingly, the popular protests 
against the Commission and conditions of the MOUs seemed to have held less sway at EU 
level than the objections of key financial stakeholders and states in our first case, an 
indication of where power lies in the contemporary EU. 
 
The role of the Troika is particularly significant. As noted above, one reason the EU attracts 
venue-shopping is that it can insulate unpopular policies against domestic opposition. The 
privatisation case suggests a further step being taken to insulate salient and unpopular 
policies from opposition and accountability. Hodson (2015) has suggested that the Troika has 
made the IMF a de facto EU institution, but it may be more helpful to conceptualise it as a 
bridge between the EU and the IMF, in effect a bridging venue, that joins these two 
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institutions and creates a new space within which policies that cannot be pursued within 
traditional EU structures can be developed and implemented.  
 
Given the importance of veto players for our analysis it is surprising that these actors are not 
discussed more extensively within the EU PET literature, where their impact remains under-
theorised. There have been calls within the policy literature to explore the scope for synthesis 
across different policy theories (Cairney 2013). Such ambitions raise challenges especially 
where different epistemological and ontological assumptions underpin approaches (ibid.). 
However, our analysis flags the importance of including more systematic evaluation of 
countervailing forces or veto players within EU PET to account for incremental change. 
Indeed, one problem with our expectations is that they become tautologous: where alternative 
images and venues are available, and countervailing forces can be overcome, policy change 
can follow. Without carefully drawing out and articulating clear hypotheses PET is in danger 
of being used as a post-hoc analytical heuristic that can capture some kinds of change but has 
limited traction when cases without change are analysed (Givel 2010). 
 
The work on institutional friction which seeks to capture the effects of countervailing forces 
or veto players has provided a welcome addition to the literature (Jones et al. 2003; 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Walgrave and Vleingenthart 2010). Comparative longitudinal 
analyses such as that provided by Baumgartner et al. (2009) tell us that, regardless of political 
systems and the nature of veto points within states, broad patterns of punctuated equilibria 
can be detected. But only through detailed analysis of qualitative cases can we determine how 
or why veto players mobilise, or institutional structures act as an obstacle in some cases and 
not in others. For example, Walgrave and Varone (2008) suggest that political parties are key 
veto-players and agents of change in polities dominated by parties. Crucially, they, like us, 
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find that political will is an important variable determining the likelihood of change.  Our 
analysis leads us to suggest that more detailed and nuanced hypotheses are required to probe 
the extent and nature of change or stasis as a response to exogenous shocks. In the EU 
context we suggest that analysing the political will of the Commission and powerful states 
(typically, but not necessarily, France and Germany) to push through change gives a high 
degree of analytical leverage. It is clearly the case that where institutional rules impose high 
decision costs (see Jones et al. 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009), such as the OLP, which was 
used in the case of financial regulation, we can expect limited or incremental change. 
Crucially, the presence and availability of an alternative policy image is central. In our first 
case no such image emerged. In the second the privatisation policy image was recast, but it 
remained consistent with the prevailing consensus about the desirability of privatizing 
publicly owned resources. Both cases speak to the endurance of the neo-liberal capitalist 
model (Blyth 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
This article has investigated the dynamics of policy change in the EU in response to major 
external shocks by looking at two key policies that were reformed to different degrees after 
the FEC. There was incremental change in financial regulation, despite its direct causal link 
to the financial crisis, and radical change in the case of privatisation, despite the lack of 
formal EU competence in this area. Empirically, we shed novel insight onto two policies that 
are intrinsically important because of their economic and social effects. Unfit for purpose 
financial regulation fueled the financial crisis, which led to the socialisation of losses by 
taxpayers and privatisation of gains by the financial industry. Privatisation policy has far 
reaching repercussions, whereby important domestic policy choices are de facto taken by 
22 
 
outsiders (the Troika) in spite of de jure limitations upon one of those actors (the 
Commission) to legislate is this area.  
 
Our analysis suggests the need for more studies of limited policy change to address the rather 
skewed nature of the EU PET literature. This call is strengthened by the observation that as 
the acquis communautaire has extended there is increasingly limited scope for the creation of 
new venues at EU level (Daviter 2007), and arguably therefore less scope for policy change, 
but more likelihood of punctuated policy patterns over time (Jones et al. 2003). In addition, 
veto players, political will and power could be included more explicitly in the EU PET 
literature. Our analysis also suggests through careful evaluation of more cases increasingly 
nuanced depictions of policy-making can emerge. This analysis could be extended to other 
economic or financial policies directly or indirectly affected by the financial, economic and 
sovereign debt crises as wells as to other crises, such as migration or Brexit.  
 
Notes 
 
1. http://www.hradf.com/en/the-fund/mission  
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